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ANTHONY CUNNINGHAM
Consolation
We only begin to live when we conceive of life as tragedy.
                                             — William Butler Yeats
There are different ways of thinking of moral philosophy, some more ambitious than 
others. One way to see the enterprise is in pragmatic terms. We find ourselves together 
and must figure out how to coexist. Hence, we need an idea of what you can demand 
of me and I can demand of you. These and other elements of basic social life are no 
small stuff, so I don’t mean that moral philosophy is easy or unimportant when it takes 
this pragmatic turn. This approach is modest compared to the one suggested in Plato’s 
Republic when Glaucon challenges Socrates with the ring of Gyges. Glaucon wants 
Socrates to tell him why justice should really matter, why anyone who might ignore it 
would make a genuine mistake by ignoring something supremely important.
The crucial point here is what matters. I don’t mean what matters for someone who 
has come on board, so to speak. An athlete determined to play by the rules and excel 
will not look for reasons to participate. Likewise, Glaucon is not really prepared to 
abandon the sport of justice, but he wants to know why anyone should play this game. 
Gyges, the shepherd with the magic ring, can have the external rewards of justice with-
out the sacrifices. So Glaucon wants to know how and why a just life should matter 
to someone who isn’t already committed to the cause. Glaucon wants a compelling 
account of how to live, one that orbits around what really matters.
Now imagine that it might always be possible to live true to what is really impor-
tant, either because you can have everything that matters or because you can at least 
have what matters most. If this were possible, if human beings could always steer their 
lives faithfully by these lights, this would be very welcome news. In this case, you 
might say that consolation would never be beyond us. No matter what we might lose 
or miss in life, we could always have the comfort of living true to what is most impor-
tant. This would be no small thing.
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1. The Stoics: The Invulnerable Life
Consider the stoics in this vein. They paint a picture where consolation is always 
ours for the taking because the only thing that truly matters is good character. Of 
course, as the stoics would tell you, nobody ever said that being good would be easy. 
They recognize that human beings must travel an arduous road to attain that kind of 
character, divesting themselves of all sorts of stubborn, tenacious attachments along 
the way to good character. During that journey, the promise of virtue-to-be is the one 
true consolation, the star by which we should guide ourselves. Of course, not all people 
will stay on the straight and narrow; the spirit may be willing, but the flesh weak. But 
for those that stick to the road and see their way to the promised land, the rewards are 
beyond chance. Good character is invulnerable and its consolation complete. Come 
what may, no harm can come to the good person. Virtue is all that matters.
Few of us buy this view, and the reason is straightforward. The implications are pro-
found. Nothing matters but good character. Nothing. Not friends, family, loved ones. 
Not personal projects or pursuits. Indeed, the very idea of consolation is stretched for 
virtuous stoics. On this view, there are no losses to console when talking about those 
who have achieved stoic virtue.
Let me leave stoicism aside because I can’t fathom a world where good character 
is the only thing that matters. I can understand the idea, but I cannot accept the 
axiom that people matter only so far as their character is concerned. Let the stoics try 
to soften this view with all the “preferred indifferents” they like, but the bottom line 
must be that my grief and anger in the face of profound misfortune for those I love 
are manifestations of incorrect valuations. Some may believe this, but this adoration 
of character eviscerates concerns at the heart of our humanity.
2. Kant: The Rejection of Tragedy
I could say more in this vein, but I’ll ignore stoicism in favor of a more plausible 
alternative. Like the stoics, Kant believes that consolation is always possible, that we 
can always have the genuine solace of living true to what is most important. Where he 
differs is that he doesn’t think that moral goodness is the only thing that matters. There 
are different kinds of value for Kant. Moral goodness is just one variety. But it is the su-
preme value, more important than any other, different in kind and not simply degree. 
We know that moral value matters most for Kant because if moral value comes into 
conflict with other values, moral value must win. Notice that the sheer fact that moral 
goodness can come into conflict with something like happiness — where Kant thinks 
of happiness in terms of the things you happen to desire — leaves open the possibility 
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for a kind of loss that the stoics could never recognize. For instance, if someone like 
Thomas More must choose between survival by swearing an oath to King Henry or 
living true to his principles and losing his head, moral goodness commands the latter. 
The choice comes at some real loss, the loss of his life and the happiness of his family. 
Unlike the stoics, Kant doesn’t dismiss these non-moral values as nothing at all, but he 
makes them subordinate to moral goodness. And since Kant believes that it is always 
possible to be morally good, he holds out an ever-present promise of consolation: 
Come what may, you can always do the right thing, and by so doing, you can always 
have the consolation of knowing that you lived true to what matters most. Moral 
goodness isn’t everything, but such goodness is the most important thing — period.
Notice that for Kant’s vision of consolation to be more than an idle wish, we must 
be able to steer our course by the lights of moral goodness and that goodness has to 
be supreme. In other words, it must always be possible to do the right thing, and by 
so doing, to stick to what matters most. So we have to be able to know the right thing 
and be able to do it. Kant thought this was so. On the other hand, most people in 
everyday life have serious doubts. For one thing, what matters most isn’t always so 
clear. Sometimes we have an idea of what things matter, but try as we might, we just 
can’t figure out what is most important. In other cases, we may have a sense of what 
matters more than what, but the contest may be such that the winner hardly feels like 
a victor that can provide much consolation. What matters more may only barely beat 
out what matters less, and the consolation from the contest of the more and the less 
may seem slim indeed.
Kant acknowledged the phenomenon of apparent conflicts between duties (the 
things that ultimately mattered most for Kant). He certainly didn’t play up the experi-
ence, but he wrote about it briefly in his Metaphysics of Morals.1 There he says that all 
such conflicts are only apparent, that the grounds of obligations collide in such a way 
that once they are on the playing field together, one or the other inevitably gives way 
to reveal your true duty. So Kant wants to account for this everyday sense of being in 
the moral dark or stuck between a moral rock and a hard place. But he insists that this 
psychological sense of dilemma — of not being able to tell what truly matters or not 
being able to avoid soiling your hands in a clash of things that matter — is really just 
a call to moral arms: Look closer and think harder and you will see your way clear to a 
doable answer. Those who don’t are to blame for their own supposed quandary.
In the end, so far as Kant is concerned, human beings are spared any truly tragic 
fate. We can experience sadness. Plenty of it. Very bad things can happen to us — mis-
fortune, grief, disappointment. Kant departs from the stoics because he believes that 
good people can have terrible lives. But come what may, we can always have the conso-
lation of moral goodness. We are spared the possibility of a fate where moral goodness 
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might be impossible, whether it be that we cannot see the moral light or that we are 
called by conflicting demands that make goodness impossible. All life’s good things 
may not be ours, but the supreme good — moral goodness — can always be had.
Let me come clean: Kant is wrong. Though his aspiration is understandable, his 
persistent belief in this kind of consolation is a philosophical fantasy. Most people do 
not buy it, but this reluctance needs explanation. After all, not every fantasy is equal. 
The danger in any particular one is directly proportional to what is at stake. In the case 
of Kant’s consolation, what hangs in the balance is the way we understand human life 
and character. So I would like to cast doubts on this fantasy about consolation, not 
because I do not wish it were so, but simply because it isn’t so. Moral philosophy is 
about seeing us as we are and might be at our best, not about constructing a spurious 
defense of what we desperately wish were so.
I’ll use two literary examples to help explain why Kant is wrong. The examples flesh 
out the claim that sometimes there can be no true consolation for us. Sometimes there 
is precious little consolation in the all-things-considered right thing, and sometimes 
it stretches our imagination to think in terms of one alternative being better than the 
other. The deepest forms of tragedy defy the very idea of consolation. The examples 
suggest that Kant’s hope is a false hope.
3. Sophie’s Choice
The first example comes from William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice.2 A young mother 
finds herself with her two young children in Auschwitz, facing a drunken German 
doctor who holds their fate in his hands. In a moment of desperate fear, Sophie Za-
wistowska tries to influence their ominous lot by telling the doctor that they are de-
vout Catholics, not Jews. The move backfires when the doctor offers Sophie a sadistic 
choice: She can choose which of her children will go the gas chamber, or they will both 
die. At first Sophie doesn’t understand, and when she does, she momentarily refuses 
to choose. The doctor impatiently exhorts her, and at the last second, just before both 
children are whisked away, Sophie makes her choice.
“Mama!” She heard Eva’s thin but soaring cry at the instant that she thrust the 
child away from her and rose from the concrete with a clumsy stumbling mo-
tion. “Take the baby!” she called out. “Take my little girl.”
 At this point the aide — with a careful gentleness that Sophie would always 
try without success to forget — tugged at Eva’s hand and led her away into 
the waiting legion of the damned. She would forever retain a dim impression 
that the child had continued to look back, beseeching. But because she was 
now almost completely blinded by salty, thick, copious tears she was spared 
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whatever expression she wore, and she was always grateful for that. For in the 
bleakest honesty of her heart she knew that she would never have been able to 
tolerate it, driven nearly mad as she was by her last glimpse of that vanishing 
small form. (Sophie’s Choice, 529)
Sophie never recovers from her terrible choice. She survives Auschwitz, but she nev-
er knows her son’s fate. Eventually she makes her way to America and takes up with a 
charismatic schizophrenic, Nathan Landau. A young writer moves into their Brooklyn 
apartment building and is smitten with them. But Stingo eventually sees the dark side 
of Nathan’s madness. Deeply in love with Sophie, Stingo tries to rescue her from her 
increasingly violent lover. They escape New York briefly and Stingo paints a hopeful 
picture of a life they might have together. But after sleeping with Stingo, Sophie slips 
away back to Nathan, leaving Stingo a final note.
My dearest Stingo, your such a beautiful Lover I hate to leave and forgive me 
for not saying Good-Bye but I must go back to Nathan. Believe me you will 
find some wonderful Mademoiselle to make you happy on the Farm. I am so 
fond of you — you must not think bei this I am being cruel. But when I woke 
I was feeling so terrible and in Despair about Nathan, bei that I mean so filled 
with Gilt and thoughts of death it was like Eis Ice flowing in my Blut. So Must 
be with Nathan again for whatever that mean. I may not see you again but do 
believe me how much knowing you have meaned to me. You’re a great Lover 
Stingo. I feel so bad, I must go now. Forgive my poor englisch. I love Nathan 
but now feel this Hate of Life and God. FUCK God and all his Hände Werk. 
And Life too. And even what remains of Love. 
     Sophie (Sophie’s Choice, 545) 
Stingo hurries back to Brooklyn, only to find Sophie and Nathan laying dead to-
gether in bed.
4. Sethe’s Choice
My second example comes from Toni Morrison’s Beloved.3 Sethe, an escaped slave 
from the Sweet Home plantation in Kentucky, makes her way to free Ohio with the 
impossible burden of a child soon to be born. There she is finally reunited with her 
mother-in-law and the three children sent ahead via the Underground Railroad, and 
a fierce resolve takes shape in her mind. She will never let her children go back to 
slavery because now she fully appreciates the depth of slavery’s horrors. Having tasted 
freedom, she sees that they must never go back. Never.
That anybody white could take your whole self for anything that came to mind. 
Not just work, kill, or maim you, but dirty you. Dirty you so bad you forgot 
who you were and couldn’t think it up…Whites might dirty her all right, but 
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not her best thing, her beautiful, magical best thing — the part of her that 
was clean. No undreamable dreams about whether the headless, feetless torso 
hanging in the tree with a sign on it was her husband of Paul A; whether the 
bubbling-hot girls in the colored-school fire set by patriots included her daugh-
ter; whether a gang of whites invaded her daughter’s private parts, soiled her 
daughter’s thighs and threw her daughter out of the wagon. She might have to 
work the slaughterhouse yard, but not her daughter. (Beloved, 251)
But after just twenty-eight days, Sethe’s grim resolve is put to a terrible test. She spies 
an all-too-familiar hat on one of the white horsemen riding down Bluestone Road and 
quickly gathers her children to a woodshed, there to commence the grim business of 
taking their lives and her own. She succeeds in taking just one life, but when the Sweet 
Home overseer surveys the grisly scene, he concludes that Sethe has gone mad and 
goes home without her.
After a short stay in jail, Sethe returns to 124, her mother-in-law’s house. Her sons 
eventually run off and Baby Suggs dies, leaving Sethe and her daughter Denver in a 
haunted house. When Paul D, one of the Sweet Home slaves, makes his way to Sethe 
eighteen years after The Misery, the ghost of the slain child returns in the form of a 
mysterious young woman, Beloved. When Beloved finally reveals herself, Sethe re-
treats from the world with her two daughters (“Whatever is going on outside my door 
ain’t for me. The world is in this room.”).
Sethe’s attention gradually turns entirely to Beloved. For eighteen hard years Sethe 
stubbornly refused to explain herself. As she saw it, what she did was right because it 
came from a mother’s love. As far as she was concerned, she owed nobody an explana-
tion but the slain child. But try as she might in her obsessive quest to make Beloved 
understand, her child cannot see things as Sethe saw them. Denver watches her moth-
er unravel under the strain.
Sethe was trying to make up for the handsaw; Beloved was making her pay for 
it. But there would never be an end to that, and seeing her mother diminished 
shamed and infuriated her. Yet she knew Sethe’s greatest fear was the same one 
Denver had in the beginning — that Beloved might leave. That before Sethe 
could make her understand what it meant — what it took to drag the teeth 
of that saw under the little chin; to feel the baby blood pump like oil in her 
hands; to hold her face so her head would stay on; to squeeze her so she could 
absorb, still, the death spasms that shot through that adored body, plump and 
sweet with life — Beloved might leave…Whispering, muttering some justifi-
cation, some bit of clarifying information to Beloved to explain what it had 
been like, and why, and how come. It was as though Sethe didn’t really want 
forgiveness given; she wanted it refused. And Beloved helped her out. (Beloved, 
251 & 252)
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In the end, Beloved is driven off by the women in the community. Having lost her 
child for the second time, Sethe gives up, taking to her bed under a patchwork quilt, 
just as Baby Suggs had done years before. And then Paul D finds her.
He is staring at the quilt but he is thinking about her wrought-iron back; the 
delicious mouth still puffy at the corner from Ella’s fist. The mean black eyes. 
The wet dress steaming before the fire. Her tenderness about his neck jewelry 
— its three wands, like attentive baby rattlers, curving two feet into the air. 
How she never mentioned or looked at it, so he did not have to feel the shame 
of being collared like a beast. Only this woman Sethe could have left him his 
manhood like that. He wants to put his story next to hers.
“Sethe,” he says, “Me and you, we got more yesterday than anybody. We need 
some kind of tomorrow.”
He leans over and takes her hand. With the other he touches her face. “You 
your best thing, Sethe. You are.” His holding fingers are holding hers.
“Me? Me?” (Beloved, 273)
There is no telling whether Sethe can come back, whether she can rise from her bed 
and live again. But consolation’s odds seem very long for her.
5. Sophie, Sethe & Tragedy
Kant would have a ready answer for both these cases. Take Sethe. Kant would ap-
plaud Sethe’s conviction that some things are more important than life itself. In his 
Lectures on Ethics, Kant shows a degree of admiration for Cato’s decision to take his 
own life rather than be captured by Caesar.4 Such resolve demonstrates strength, but 
Kant sees the strength as misdirected. Had Cato used this strength to endure whatever 
Caesar might have done to him, he could have avoided wrongdoing. Suicide is always 
wrong for Kant.5 Likewise, taking an innocent life could never be right, so even if 
Sethe kills her child to spare her the evils of slavery, she does wrong. So while there 
is no consolation for Sethe, this is because she did the wrong thing. Under the cir-
cumstances, maybe she had no real chance for happiness, but she could have had the 
consolation of keeping her hands morally clean. For Kant, we always have that chance.
 With Sophie, the Kantian response is harder to pinpoint. On the one hand, were 
Sophie in the middle of a lake and had she to choose which child to save, surely Kant 
wouldn’t say that she should save neither if she couldn’t save both. Sometimes people 
cast Kant as uninterested in consequences, but this cannot be right. Genuine respect 
for a person would have to command a deep regard for that person’s well-being. Re-
spect without this regard would make no sense at all. So it would be perverse to imag-
ine Kant telling a mother to let both her children drown, even though by saving one, 
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she would effectively be letting the other drown. At first glance, saving one child seems 
like a simple case of making the best of a bad situation.
However, Sophie’s situation is different in two key ways. She is being asked to hand 
over a child. Maybe the difference between letting a child drown and handing over a 
child seems small. After all, dead is dead. But in Sophie’s case, she has to aim inten-
tionally at having the Nazi doctor take Eva. She doesn’t slay her daughter with her 
hand, but she tells the doctor whom to kill. Sophie’s word condemns her daughter.
Furthermore, there is an element of evil manipulation here. By choosing which 
child will die, Sophie cooperates, however begrudgingly, with the Nazi doctor’s cruel 
game. True, she does so to save her son. Nevertheless, she goes along. Perhaps Kant 
would rule out such cooperation with evil. Maybe he would advise Sophie to wash her 
hands of the cruel choice, to cast the decision back on her sadistic oppressor.
I’ll be honest. I’m not sure what Kant would or should say here. If the question is 
posed in terms of which child must die (as opposed to which can live), I strongly sus-
pect that Kant would forbid an answer. Fortunately, nothing hangs here on a definitive 
answer. Whatever Kant’s answer might be — hand over one child, refuse to choose, 
fight the men who would lay hands on her children — Kant would say that Sophie 
can do the right thing and when she does it, she can find genuine consolation in the 
choice. Again, we can always do the right thing, so we can always have the consolation 
of doing what matters most.
Stay with Sophie for a moment. If I put myself in her shoes and imagine a choice 
between my own two daughters, I’m not sure what to say. If asked whether I’d rather 
lose one daughter or both, the answer is perfectly clear. But the difference between 
losing one and choosing one is no little thing for a parent. Let’s imagine I see that resis-
tance is futile and that my love is such that I cannot let both die. Sophie had no coin 
to toss when she made her choice, but suppose I do, and suppose I can leave things to 
chance. Heads for Flannery; tails for Madeleine. This way, one will live, and at least 
the one who dies will see her sentence as a matter of pure chance, not a consequence 
of my greater love or preference for her sister.
If you don’t like this strategy, formulate an alternative. For instance, I could beg the 
doctor to kill me. When he refuses my offer and insists on my choice, I could defy 
him. “Do what you will,” I might say, “But I will not condemn my own child. Never.” 
When his aides put their hands on my children, I could fight like hell, but I am just 
one man and I am powerless to stop them. They are too many and too strong. So on 
this alternative, both my children die. But at least I have refused to buy the life of one 
at the expense of the other, coin toss or no coin toss.
 I cannot see how I can escape this situation unscathed. Either way, my hands have 
blood on them. Either way, my hands are dirty. Someone like Kant would protest. 
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“You are confused. You are not morally responsible,” he would say, “because this bad 
man kills your children, not you.” For Kant, there is a right answer (at least one) for 
any situation. So long as you do the right thing, guilt and shame are misplaced. If you 
feel these emotions, they are irrational feelings that you should discount. Whichever it 
is — saving one or refusing to choose — I cannot be caught with no moral way out. 
Kant believes I can always remain clean. I disagree.
Clear dichotomies are very alluring. Up or down. True or false. Good or bad. Right 
or wrong. We like to know for sure, with no gray areas or complications to muck up 
the understanding. We find understandable comfort in such things. Kant and contem-
porary Kantians explain a sense of dirty hands as a psychological reaction to certain 
kinds of difficult choices. Make no mistake — doing the right thing can be plenty 
hard. Kantians can readily acknowledge this fact. But they insist that you must take 
care to focus on moral responsibility. Sure, say Kantians, you often should feel bad for 
those negatively impacted by doing the right thing. While it can’t make any sense to 
feel morally guilty or ashamed for doing the right thing on a Kantian view, all sorts of 
other emotions can make perfect sense. A good person may have to do many things 
after doing the right thing. It may behoove me to impress upon a justly harmed party 
how sorry I am that the moral law called for this harm. But in this case, there is no 
paradox of something being right and wrong at the same time.
This legalistic way of seeing the world is a comforting philosophical fantasy, and a 
malicious one at that. Sophie suffers from terrible guilt for handing over her daugh-
ter. So would I. This guilt would be fully compatible with thinking I’d done the best 
thing, all-things-considered. My sense of guilt would not be fleshed out in terms of the 
thought “I could and should have done otherwise.” Whether I might hand over one 
daughter or neither, I would have to work directly against my deepest attachments, to 
betray my most cherished loves. If someone tried to comfort me with the idea that at 
least I saved one or that I wasn’t implicated in their deaths, this solace would be cold 
comfort or no comfort at all. True enough, the thought “I did the right thing” can be a 
powerful balm and rightly so. But not in this case. I love my children. And in the case 
at hand, I fail one or the other or both — period. If I could find meaningful consola-
tion in the abstract thought that I did the right thing, if this thought could somehow 
buoy my psyche, I wouldn’t be much of a father. I doubt that thoughts of right or 
wrong would even enter into the picture, but if they did, they certainly wouldn’t oper-
ate as a simple dichotomy. Right and wrong, like good and bad, exist in degrees. Even 
in the all-things-considered right (or good) choice there can be profound elements of 
wrong (and badness). There would be in Sophie’s case (if there is even any sense to one 
choice being right). She must hold hands with evil, one way or another, be it by hand-
ing a child over, or by remaining mum while they take her children. In this case, even 
the all-things-considered right thing can dirty you. Failing to acknowledge this fact 
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about human lives and character is a case of sticking one’s head in the philosophical 
sand. You can try to define away this kind of experience, but doing so is just playing 
with words.
The notion of cost is absolutely vital here. All our choices involve some cost, though 
most everyday choices do not carry costs that rise to the level of the tragic. With tragic 
costs, the price is so dear that it strikes at the very heart of who we are. Whether I have 
to forsake one beloved thing for another or endure something evil to avert something 
worse, the cost can be such that “winning” is losing. This is Sophie’s case. She pur-
chases her son’s life at the cost of her daughter’s. Imagine little Eva’s last thoughts. Her 
mother, the one who is responsible for keeping her safe and sound, the one who is 
supposed to love her without fail or question, gives her up for the sake of her brother. 
Sophie has to know that her choice must feel like nothing short of betrayal to Eva. 
Try living with that for the rest of your life as a mother and see how you do. So-called 
words of comfort like “It’s not your fault” or “What else could you do?” can’t change 
the fact that you abandoned one child for the other. Yes, you were under extreme du-
ress. Yes, the situation was not your making. Yes, you saved one child. But to think that 
you might wiggle out of a crushing sense of responsibility by appeal to some narrow 
conception of responsibility is to turn a blind eye on what it means to be a parent. We 
certainly cannot blame Sophie, but just as surely, Sophie cannot exonerate herself, at 
least not if she is a loving mother.
Kant might chalk all this up to the unfortunate, ever-dangerous vagaries of our 
empirical psychology. In his book, reason must always rule over our affective proclivi-
ties by serving as a kind of filter that gives the seal of approval to all our motivations. 
Only reason’s dominion in this sense can keep us on the straight and narrow. And what 
reason ultimately tells us is that we can always do the right thing — period. Yet Kant’s 
picture turns human life and character on their heads: We must fit Kant’s theory, 
rather than Kant’s theory being consistent with the facts of our empirical psychology. 
Consider this. When Kant says that Cato could have resisted Caesar’s tortures no 
matter what (and thus he did not have to take his own life for fear of what Caesar’s 
methods might do to his character), this faith certainly cannot come from pure reason 
as Kant seems to believe. The facts of our empirical psychology cannot be discovered 
in metaphysics, no more than metaphysics can tell us how fast a person can run the 
mile. In this regard, we must bow before the empirical facts — period. How fast can 
we run? This fast. What does it mean to love someone? This is what it means. The 
answers are only to be found by looking at us, not to metaphysics. So when Kant and 
company rule out cases of dirty hands — instances where you are caught between a 
rock and hard place and cannot avoid profound ethical costs — they engage in flights 
of fancy that make the world a safe place by ruling out such phenomena by definition. 
Come what may, you can always remain morally whole. Even in the midst of numbing 
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heartache, disappointment, and loss, you can always have the invaluable consolation 
of living an upright life. It is said, so indeed, it must be so. But Kant and company are 
wrong. There is no such safe place, however much we might wish for it.
In this light, consider Sethe. Perverse as it may sound, Sophie may actually have 
it easy compared to Sethe. At least Sophie has the clarity of the terms of her choice: 
one death or two. Again, were she not forced to have a hand in the choice, clearly one 
death would be the uncomplicated lesser of two evils. Sethe is not so fortunate. Think 
about her circumstances. Flight is not an option. She cannot escape with four small 
children. She could resist, but she would stand no chance against four armed men. 
So as she sees things, her choices come down to taking her children’s lives by her own 
hand or surrendering. Think about the latter. Sethe knows what they would face at 
Sweet Home. Once upon a time, when Sweet Home was run by Mr. Garner, his slaves 
were a different lot. They were allowed unusual freedoms and they took a special pride 
in their status. Even Garner prided himself on his class of slaves: “…Garner came 
home bruised and pleased, having demonstrated what a real Kentuckian was: one 
tough enough and smart enough to make and call his own niggers men.” (Beloved, 11) 
But when Garner dies and Schoolteacher takes over the plantation for Mrs. Garner, 
everything changes. The iron fist emerges from the velvet glove. So Sethe knows that 
her children will be bound, broken, used and abused without end. Schoolteacher’s 
nephews may someday steal her daughters’ milk, just as they stole hers. Sethe got 
through it, but she knows the profound toll it takes on a person, the toll it took on 
the Sweet Home slaves. Years later, Paul D suffers from the deep-seated shame that he 
was only a man at Sweet Home and that his manhood was Garner’s whim. Only Sixo 
seemed incapable of being broken, and the price of his strength was being roasted alive 
while tied to a tree, laughing and singing all the while so that his captors might know 
what it meant to be a man. And Sixo had the benefit of many years under Garner 
before he faced Schoolteacher’s trials. Sethe’s children would not be so lucky. They 
would be reared by Schoolteacher, not Garner, and that would make all the difference.
Stay with this crucial point for another moment. If her children go back to Sweet 
Home, Sethe would certainly do everything in her power to shield them from School-
teacher. But every day would be filled with large and small moments of compromise 
and cooperation with evil in order to survive. Her children would have to watch her 
bossed about, beaten down, and degraded, and she would have to witness the same for 
them. Any righteous protest or indignation would simply rain down more of the same 
on them all. So Sethe would have to “let” Schoolteacher and his nephews defile her 
children and defile their mother in front of them. Her begrudging cooperation for the 
sake of sheer survival would militate against the very attachments and commitments 
that define her psychologically, but anything short of obedience would not do with 
a man like Schoolteacher. He’d have no interest in leaving any shred of a slave’s self-
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respect intact. Quite the contrary. A master’s dominion would demand homage and 
deference. Thus, she would have to work with evil to survive each day, just as survivors 
in places like Auschwitz had to curb their impulses to help or to cry out against the 
profound injustice and inhumanity around them. Each and every day would work 
against who Sethe is at her very core — a loving mother who cannot bear to see “her 
best thing, her beautiful, magical best thing” systematically defiled. Of course, Kant 
might tell Sethe that she and her children could suffer degradation and remain morally 
whole, just as Cato could have endured whatever Caesar might have done to him. But 
anyone who knows anything about how the spirit and body can be relentlessly broken 
by those with the will and the power and a taste for cruelty should recognize such faith 
for what it is — pie-in-the-sky theorizing. Simply put, we are not the creatures Kant 
imagined in his flights of wild fancy.
So next to this wicked fate at Sweet Home, death seems like a friend to Sethe. But 
this is not just death. This is death by her hand. A mother’s hand. With no time for 
any thought save “No. No. Nono. Nonono,” Sethe flies to the woodshed. After she is 
done, she refuses to acknowledge any cost because she did what she did from love. She 
meant to spare her child from something worse, and that is all that matters to her at 
the time. For eighteen years she beats back the past, carefully managing her memories 
and emotions to rule out any disquieting doubts. When Paul D appears, he brings 
Sweet Home with him, and he speeds banished feelings to the surface. When Beloved 
reveals herself, Sethe must finally explain her actions.
Sethe pleaded for forgiveness, counting, listing again and again her reasons: 
that Beloved was more important, meant more to her than her own life. That 
she would trade places any day. Give up her own life, every minute and hour 
of it, to take back just one of Beloved’s tears. Did she know it hurt her when 
mosquitoes bit her baby? That to leave her on the ground to run into the big 
house drove her crazy? That before leaving Sweet Home Beloved slept every 
night on her chest or curled on her back? Beloved denied it. Sethe never came 
to her, never said a word to her, never smiled and worst of all never waved 
goodbye or even looked her way before running away from her. (Beloved, 241)
Think about Beloved. From her point of view, her mother killed her — end of story. 
Of course, there is more to the story. Much more. But no explaining can change the 
fact that Sethe aimed directly at taking her own child’s life. Of the two things — a 
life of slavery or a quick death — Sethe chose what she saw as the lesser of two evils. 
When Paul D questions her and insists there had to be some other way to protect her 
children, Sethe’s response is unmoving: “It ain’t my job to know what’s worse. It’s my 
job to know what is and to keep them away from what I know is terrible. I did that.” 
(Beloved, 165) When he criticizes her by saying that her love is “too thick,” she says 
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that “Thin love ain’t love at all.” She even feels contempt for Paul D because he should 
not pass judgment on something he cannot understand.
Too thick, he said. My love is too thick. What he know about it? Who in 
the world is he willing to die for? Would he give his privates to a stranger in 
exchange for a carving? Some other way, he said. There must have been some 
other way. Let schoolteacher haul us away, I guess, to measure our behind be-
fore he tore it up? I have felt what it felt like and nobody walking or stretched 
out is going to make you feel it too. (Beloved, 203)
Yet, as Sethe tries in vain to explain herself, she finds that there is no clear way 
of measuring out these two evils, no way to make her child see the wisdom of her 
motherly calculations. The solace that has buoyed her for years can no longer keep her 
afloat. Beloved in the flesh destroys this false hope. Having to answer to her makes a 
mockery of Sethe’s defiant certainty. Denied this certainty, Sethe eventually disinte-
grates under the weight of her terrible burdens.
This is the worst form of tragedy, where we cannot get a measure of the relative costs 
of the alternatives and inch our way toward some small consolation. The problem in 
such cases is not that we simply lack the right tool for precise measurement. There is 
no such tool. Some things defy measurement by their very nature. Computations are 
not part of the picture. In Sethe’s case, the horrors of each bad thing — killing her 
child or seeing that child systematically defiled—are such that they defy the possibility 
of taking comfort in the idea that things could have been worse or that at least some-
thing good was spared. Try as she might, she cannot make any sense of one thing as 
better (or less bad). And when she faces that realization, it crushes her. Even a mother’s 
love is no refuge. Perhaps Paul D’s loving hand can coax Sethe back from the abyss, 
but if so, this will have nothing to do with taking consolation from the best thing, all 
things considered. No such consolation can be had.
6. Human Lives Without Tragedy?
I suspect that Kantians (and others with faith in ethical theories) may balk and 
insist that there is a serious equivocation at work here. Perhaps the notions of what 
matters is the culprit. After all, all sorts of things can matter to us in the sense of car-
ing deeply about something. Kant’s moral law, or any other moral law for that matter, 
cannot guarantee that any given person will care about the right things, in the right 
way. Maybe the inconsolable are idiosyncratically inconsolable because they are blind 
to things that matter in some more important sense. Perhaps the inconsolable do not 
see and appreciate what really and truly matters most.
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We should keep in mind who bears the burden of proof. Nobody has to plumb 
any arcane mysteries to understand how and why their children matter to Sophie 
and Sethe. Anyone who insists that something else matters more or that there is some 
deeper sense of mattering as opposed to Sophie and Sethe’s love must do more than 
state this claim. One can talk about “views from nowhere” or categorical imperatives 
trumping the facts of our empirical psychology, but I’m not sure what such claims are 
really supposed to mean. Any philosophical perspective that substitutes theory for a 
clear depiction of us and what we are really like makes a terrible mistake. And one 
basic fact of our empirical psychology that any theory must come to grips with is that 
our lives are deeply constituted by the loves around which they tend to orbit.
Indeed, step back for a moment and consider the implications if there were no such 
possibilities for profound tragedy, if Kant were right that consolation were always to 
be had. What would it mean for all our loves to be reconcilable by necessity? If we are 
very lucky, our deepest loves can coexist in everyday life, at least for the most part and 
to a large degree. Mind you, I don’t mean some blessed harmony where we can have 
it all without any significant loss or compromise. This is a childish fantasy. Even Kant 
didn’t believe that we could have it all. He just thought that we could always have what 
matters most. So he believed that the things that are important are reconcilable in the 
sense that they are ordered canonically and we can always be faithful to the best thing. 
Kant believed that our deepest interest as rational beings — whatever our psychologi-
cal inclinations might tell us — should be in living a life true to a deliberative process 
that could always discriminate between right and wrong. All we had to do was give 
ourselves to this process and exercise the will to live true to its results.
Even if this deliberative process held the water that Kant and Kantians believe (it 
doesn’t, but this is a different issue), think what we would be like if we were creatures 
whose highest interest — indeed, whose absolutely supreme interest (again, where this 
interest is different in kind and not just degree) — were in living true to the moral law. 
Such a picture of human life and character would leave out and distort many things, 
but most importantly, it would leave out all the love. As Sophie and Sethe’s stories 
suggest, we are capable of all sorts of loves, and they do not fit a Kantian profile. If we 
go through life without any deep loves, we do so at our own great peril. For the vast 
majority of us with deep, disparate loves, we ply the waters of life beset with all sorts of 
conflicts and compromises. We must sacrifice this for that, look here rather than there, 
devote ourselves to this thing and not the other. Not all these choices are tragic. Far 
from it. But so long as our loves define us — as they must if they are true loves — then 
we are given to the ever-present possibility of tragedy. Indeed, our lives are authenti-
cally human only when we heed Yeats’ wise words about tragedy and accept the fact 
that our loves are diverse and inexorably prone to conflict. If we are very lucky, we can 
keep from getting pervasively dirty. But we can never guarantee the purity of complete 
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cleanliness — save at the price of our humanity. We are messy, complicated creatures. 
This is not only our sad fate, but a large part of our beauty. Of course, those who hold 
fast to beloved theories that offer a different vision of our humanity will not see things 
this way, but so much the worse for them.
Tony Cunningham is Professor of Philosophy.
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